International Organizations

News and Comment: the G20 and Africa Part 2

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The G20 has a lot of issues on its plate and at the top of the list, obviously, is the on-going financial crisis.  I have already commented on the problems African countries face in getting their voices heard. On that point, Africa may have an ally in Pope Benedict who, recently returned from his Africa travels, noted the problems of adequate representation from those “who suffer most from the harmful effects of a crisis for which they do not bear responsibility”. The Pope suggests states rely on the UN and associated institutions. Jeffrey Sachs has also jumped on this bandwagon, noting that while South Africa will be present “South Africa by itself represents South Africa”.  And we all know that South Africa is not a “typical” African country (if there is such a thing).

On the point of South Africa, it might be useful to remember that President Motlanthe himself may not be in the strongest position to represent his country’s interests, given all the recent upheaval within the South African political system and the temporary nature of his position as President.

NGOs, such as Oxfam, are trying to use their influence to encourage the G20 to commit to aiding Africa as it deals with the crisis. Duncan Green, head of research for Oxfam, highlights their main requests of the G20 in a recent blog post. He comments as well on a leaked copy of a G20 communique, obtained by the Financial Times.  Indeed, the way these conferences usually go, it is likely that at least some of the major decisions have already been negotiated ahead of time. Which leaves one to wonder whether adding an African voice at this point could make a difference.

The World Bank has published figures (reported on BBC News) that somewhat echo the gloomy global economic forecasts of the IMF and OECD.

The forecast predicts that developing countries will need $1.3tn in external financing to repay debt and cover balance of payments problems, and may fall short.

The idea that African countries, in particular, could be major losers in this crisis has been underscored by a number of analysts and commentators including Egypt’s finance minister, Oxfam’s Duncan Green (commenting on the case of Zambia), and Kofi Anan (who argues that the crisis “hits Africa twice”).

Other G20 news:

Apparently, protestors see the G20 meeting as an opportunity to demonstrate their unhappiness with a wide range of global issues, from the financial crisis to the “siege of Gaza” to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  While I understand their frustrations with global leadership on these matters, I don’t think it helps their cause to get into fights with the British police.  Apparently, these frustrations are being vented worldwide.

China is trying to exhibit its leadership potential as well.  This has included lobbying for a new “super-sovereign reserve currency to replace the U.S. dollar”, the provision of advice to rich countries, and lobbying to stop states from moving towards trade and investment protectionism.

The Chinese are not the only ones worried about protectionism. Pascal Lamy, head of the WTO, has warned that moves towards protectionism may further impact the already troubled Doha round of trade negotiations.

News and Comment: The G20 and Africa

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In my Africa in World Politics class this week, I’ve been talking about the role of African states in global economic governance. This has been a focus of my own research, stressing the important roles coalitions can play, but how those roles are strongly influenced by the institutional and strategic environments that states operate in.  At the World Bank or IMF, African coalitions tend to have no impact due at least partly to the power and voting structure of those institutions. At the WTO, coalitions have had major impacts in negotiations (the Cairns Group in the Uruguay Round, the “Cotton Four” group of African countries more recently).

Right now many of the important issues regarding our global economy are being debated by a forum of industrialized and emerging market countries, the G20. Their meeting in London next month, appropriately is targeted at dealing with the current financial crisis and its spillover effects.There is one African state member of that group, South Africa, and other African states are expected to be present in less formal roles as well.

There is some hope that African issues will have a place on the agenda at the G20 meeting. But as Kofi Annan argues in a guest column on AllAfrica.com, Africa needs to have more systematic representation at the G20 if the G20 is going to be an important decision-making forum. Also, African states need to continue their hard lobbying for greater voice at the IMF and World Bank, especially given the important role the IMF plays in developing the norms of the global financial system.  My suggestion would be that African states concentrate on encouraging decision-making rules that favor coalitional behavior.  If the lessons of the WTO tell us anything, it is that some institutional settings provide greater scope for developing country influence than others.


See also: Daniel Bradlow’s post at Opinio Juris

Darfur and the ICC

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A major debate has been brewing over whether the ICC’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir was a “good idea”. In my view, our answer to this question depends on our criteria for a “good idea”. I think a common perception is that this is a justice versus order issue. Justice may be achieved by the ICC’s actions, but at the cost of more lives and greater political chaos in the Sudan. However, a number of commentators have (rightfully) muddied that easy equation. A roundtable discussion at The New Republic is also trying to answer these questions while making suggestions for what, exactly Obama should do.

Criteria One: Good Idea = Contributes to End of the Humanitarian Disaster in Darfur

Probably the most popular criteria is based on the assumption that our primary goal should be to end the current humanitarian disaster in Darfur, whether or not we call it a genocide (I still like Scott Strauss’ Foreign Affairs article on this point).

Julian Ku at Opinion Juris makes the clear academic argument that international criminal tribunals can lead to greater humanitarian atrocities (but not that this is a necessary outcome). Michael Kleinman offers a similar view from the perspective of someone who has worked in the field of humanitarian relief, arguing about the already clear dire humanitarian consequences of the ICC’s decisions.

Chris Blattman,  is among those who seriously doubt that the ICC’s actions can have positive consequences. He has a great link to Wronging Rights’ post on the subject.

However, one could also make the argument that the short-term costs are outweighed by the long-term benefits of action, as Kevin Heller seems to in a recent post. After all, someone has to do something about the roots of the crisis and no other actions (yet) seem to aim for that.

Criteria Two: Good Idea = Contributes to the Development of International Human Rights

Human Rights Watch clearly supports the ICC’s decision. In a separate Q&A section, they highlight the cases that arrest warrants against Liberian leader Charles Taylor and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic actually helped the peace processes in those countries as well. One can wonder whether these are useful cases as a number of commentators have mentioned that, for instance, the international community only went after Milosevic once the conflict had been settled.

Alex de Waal also makes a great case for how the ICC actions may actually undermine the cause of human rights in Africa. He wonders whether African countries will follow Libya’s calls to de-ratify the Rome Statute of the ICC.  I’m not convinced this is really going to happen on a large scale, but it is true that the ICC’s actions may make some African states that have not joined more wary about joining (there are only 30 African states that have ratified at this point, I believe).

Criteria Three: Good Idea = Contributes to Justice (International and/or Local)

As some of the commentators already mentioned above have argued, the question of how to achieve justice is far from clear. Alex de Waal mentions Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s New York Times call for African states to support the ICC and its role in providing justice.  However, Alex notes that South Africa demonstrated that retributive justice is not the only form of justice.  Additionally, there is the concern that ICC’s actions have undermined the ability of local judicial (and political–there is to be an election later this year) institutions to deal with the problem.

Criteria Four: Good Idea = This is What International Law Tells Us to Do

This is essentially the case that Eric Reeves makes when he argues that Obama should support the ICC’s actions (Elizabeth Rubin makes a similar point.)

Some question issues of ICC jurisdiction and whether the UN Security Council’s referral to the ICC undermines the principle of complementarity (the idea that the ICC should be a court of last resort and that local judicial institutions should be used first).

Relevant to these points is a consideration of the proper role of the ICC. Should we think of ICC prosecutors as we think of criminal prosecutors in domestic legal systems?  A common theme in American legal textbooks is that the role of the prosecutor is “to seek justice”. This is not too different from the primary emphasis described in the Rome Statue: Prosecutors should investigate crimes.  Does the ICC really have any responsibility to consider the trade-offs between justice and peace/order?  Justice Goldstone has argued that the Prosecutor’s duites are “exernal to the political process of negotiations to end armed conflict”, but there is an “order” dimension to Moreno-Ocampo’s assertion that the Prosecutor’s office should also contribute to the prevention of crimes (see Winfield‘s post on this). But has the international community provided the ICC with all of the necessary tools to consider such trade-offs?

Further Thoughts on What To Do About Leaders We Do Not Like

All of this reminds me of arguments that have been made a number of times about what should be done about problematic political leaders, and especially dictators.  Scott Adams, of Dilbert fame, has even piped in on such debates with his idea of a “retired dictator program”.  His idea is more serious than it might at first sound.  Kieth Hartley at York University, made the argument in 2005 that it would have been cheaper to pay Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq. And, while optimistic about the role of an ICC, Hans Koechler has argued in the past that “the promise of a comfortable pension or discreet exile is sometimes the most expedient way to dislodge despots from power” (cited by Jeremy Bransten).

More generally–and not necessarily directed at “bad” leaders–Mo Ibrahim has wondered whether something should be done to make retirement more attractive to African leaders. This thinking contributed to his prize for African leaders who rule fairly and resign to elected successors.

Final Thoughts

In many respects, the debate about whether or not the ICC should have issued an arrest warrant for President Omar Al Bashir is rapidly losing relevancy.  We now need to turn to thinking about what to do about the current situation. Clearly there have been short-term negative consequences for the humanitarian situation in Darfur.  What can we do to make the medium- and long-term situation improve?